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The topic of this panel is one of the few areas of intellectual property
that are bitterly contested between the United States and the European
Union. Various aspects of that feud have already been analyzed in
Professor Gangjee's presentation,' and were addressed in the comments by
other panelists. On the other hand, it also became obvious that there is
widespread agreement at least on certain basic principles, which can be
summarized as follows.
The indication of geographical origin of a product can furnish
important and valuable information for consumers. This concerns in
particular those goods where such indications imply a message about the
specific taste or quality derived from the geographical source, as may
typically be the case with foodstuff and other agricultural products. There
is no doubt at all that it is in the interest of consumers as well as of
producers that such information is correct and complete, and that efficient
means exist to prevent the misleading use of such designations.
Holders of trademarks that are synonymous with, or very similar to,
descriptive terms, including terms indicating commercial origin, cannot
object to the same term being used by others, in a fair and correct manner,
in order to indicate the quality and/or geographical origin of their own
products.
Why, then, do we have an ongoing argument between the EU and the
U.S. (and others) that has not calmed down very much even after the WTO
Panel report of March 2005?2 Here is an attempt at summarizing those
points.
* Professor, Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich.
1. Dev Gangjee, London Sch. of Econ., Lecture at the Chicago-Kent College of Law Symposium
on Intellectual Property, Trade, & Development: Geographic Indications and Trademarks (Oct. 12,
2006).
2. Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indica-
tions for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WTO Doc. WT/DS I 74/R (Mar. 15, 2005).
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It is contested:
(1) whether protection for a geographical indicator ("GI") should go
beyond the basic protection against deceptive or misleading use-i.e.,
whether it is advisable for other countries to adopt regimes similar to that
applied in the EU; and/or whether the provisions on protection of GIs
presently embedded in the TRIPS Agreement 3 should be amended so as to
establish, on the international level, a special regime for the registration of
GIs, with the possible consequence that the absolute protection granted
under TRIPS Article 23 for wines and spirits is extended to other products
as well; and
(2) whether the provision imposing coexistence between a prior
trademark right and a subsequent GI under the EU GI regime is essentially
the same as, and can be justified by, the generally accepted rules on "fair
use of descriptive terms" in TRIPS Article 17.
Only the second issue is of immediate relevance for the topic of this
panel. However, both aspects are basically connected, as has become
apparent from Professor Gangjee's presentation, and shall further be
outlined in these comments.
I. STARTING POINT: THE "INHERENT INFORMATIONAL VALUE" SCALE
Why do conflicts between trademarks and GIs arise in the first place?
Professor Gangjee has indicated that this is due to a complex interaction
between territoriality and the general dynamics of trademark law-or rather
the law of distinctive signs at large-as an area within the broader field of
unfair competition regulations. Where the knowledge and perception of
people-the relevant public-is a decisive factor in the legal assessment,
the relevant parameters are bound to change over time. A term that
corresponds to a name on the map at one point in time can raise distinct
geographic associations in the public, or it may appear bland and neutral. In
the first case, it can nevertheless, in the course of time, develop into a sign
informing about the commercial origin of goods or services, instead of, or
in addition to, their place of production. Likewise, in the second case, the
public may learn over time that the name does have a connotation
concerning the geographical origin of products, and that such information
is of interest for the public's purchasing decisions. In addition, territoriality
is a moving target par excellence: where markets have been clearly
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/
legal e/27-trips.pdf.
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separated only a while ago, the increase in international trade and
communication tends to erode the traditional barriers, turning the world
into a single shopping mall.
It is true that both elements militate against a strict application of the
"first in time, first in right" ("FITFIR") principle4 that usually governs the
resolution of disputes between conflicting signs. Even with regard to
trademark law proper (i.e., conflicts arising between marks originally used
in different markets) there is reason to argue that the traditional rules might
need to be revisited. Concerning the GI/trademark interface, the diagnosis
points even more in the direction of a general overhaul.
Up to this point, this comment has simply followed and endorsed
Professor Gangjee's analysis. But if we actually do need to substitute, or at
least complement, FITFIR by something else, what is our new paradigm?
Where do we find a set of principles offering some stability within that
mobile field?
It is submitted here that, ideally, 5 that stable basis ought to be
provided by the objective, inherent informational value of the indication at
stake. In a rough overview, the following types of GIs-in the most general
sense, i.e., irrespective of current definitions in TRIPS or the EU GI
Regulation 6-can be distinguished: (1) GIs indicating quality that cannot
be produced anywhere else, because it results from the unique conditions of
the place of origin; (2) GIs indicating specific quality or other
characteristics based on conditions or skills that are not unique; and (3)
mere indications of the place of origin.
If it were possible to develop such a scheme on the basis of generally
accepted criteria, and if it were actually capable of being applied in a clear,
transparent fashion, the route towards resolution of the pertinent conflicts
would hopefully become somewhat easier to travel. For instance, the
possibility of acquiring a positive right in a GI, even at a time when
someone else has acquired valid trademark rights in the same or a similar
term, appears justified for the first and strongest type of indication. It
appears more doubtful for the second type, which might also be referred to
as an application of the general rules on fair use of descriptive terms. 7 This
is also the correct solution for the last type of GIs. To mark the difference
4. Professor Gangjee's nomenclature is adopted here.
5. I'm personally skeptical regarding the prospects of that ideal being attained in ptactice. See
discussion infra Part 11.
6. Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations
of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12 [hereinafter GI Regulation].
7. See discussion infra Part 111.
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between them, the standard for assessment of what constitutes "fair use"
might be more generous for the second type of GIs than for the third.
Also with regard to the international level, a differentiated approach
based on the inherent informational value of GIs might be meaningful.
Keeping terms free from protection in any other country on a formal basis,
irrespective of the actual knowledge and perception of the public, might
arguably be justified for the first type of GI, whose unique informational
value would otherwise be at risk of getting lost. For the second type, the
argument is less strong. It should be sufficient to apply general rules, such
as prohibition of misleading statements-with results that may change over
time in propQrtion to the public's awareness of the original meaning of the
term-and/or provisions against registration of marks in bad faith. In that
context, it might make sense to set up an international database comprising
such terms, hut only as a supplementary, informative tool. Finally, for the
last category, it does not seem appropriate to take any steps at all on the
international level; application of the provisions usually governing
trademark protection of (potentially descriptive) terms is sufficient.
II. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN THE EU AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
The caveat was made above that a scheme relying on the inherent
informational value of GIs could only entail satisfactory results if the
criteria were theoretically sound and their application practically feasible.
Indeed, this is a key issue for the whole matter: how convincing, reliable,
and transparent can such a system possibly be? And what about its
efficiency-would the investment in bureaucracy, testing, and monitoring
facilities that are inevitable corollaries of its establishment actually be set
off by the beneficial effects it entails for local producers as well as for
consumers?'.
Coming from Europe, where a regime for specific protection of GIs
has been set up and operating since the 1990s, 8 I remain a confessed
skeptic. First, although the EU regulation makes it mandatory to establish
the link between the quality of the product and its geographical origin, it is
not so clear how serious and reliable the tests actually are. As most of us
are laymen in the field, we have to trust the competent authorities to do
their job correctly. However, what trust that may have existed in the
8. GI Regulation, supra note 6, was first enacted in 1992 as Council Regulation 2081/92, On the
Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Food-
stuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1.
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unbiased exercise of the European authorities' tasks was badly shaken, for
example, in the context of the "Feta" case, which ultimately led to
protection of that designation for cheese originating from Greece. 9 How
convincing is it to claim that the natural surroundings in most of the Greek
territory-comprising diverse landscapes such as isles, plains, and
mountains-are exactly such that this particular cheese can be produced,
while the same cannot be done in neighboring Bulgaria?
Second, the informing effects that protected GIs have on consumers-
resulting from the fact that the products bear, in addition to the GI itself,
the indications "PDO" (Protected Designation of Origin), "PGI" (Protected
Geographical Indication), or their equivalents in other languages-appear
modest at best. Considering myself an average European consumer, I
cannot remember ever having paid attention to those signs. If that attitude
should be representative of others as well, it would mean that the system
hardly does what it is generally ascribed to do: namely, bolster to a
substantial degree the sales of products bearing those acronyms.' 0 Of
course, well-known specialties such as Roquefort cheese-not to mention
champagne' '--do very well on the market, but that is another matter. They
were already champions in their respective fields long before the present
system was introduced.
What the regime does quite efficiently, though, is restrict anything
coming close to a competitive challenge to products bearing a protected
GI. 12 The provisions setting out the scope and contents of the protection
granted are carefully crafted so as to make impossible even the slightest
allusion to-let alone actual use of, for descriptive purposes-a GI. 13 And
9. Joined Cases C-465/02 & C-466/02, F.R.G. v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9115; see also Joined
Cases C-289/96, C-293/96, & C-299/96, Denmark v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1541 (annulling the first
registration).
10. I am not aware of any survey having been conducted in the EU about the impact of the protec-
tion under the GI Regulation on the actual sales of products.
I1. Denominations for wines and spirits are not protected on the basis of the Regulation on food-
stuffs and agricultural products, but they are regulated separately and even more strictly.
12. As to the reach of protection into the area of commercial speech, two German cases
concerning the crown jewel of all GIs, champagne, may be quoted as warning examples. The first of
these concerned an advertisement by a computer firm using the slogan "Get champagne, pay for
sparkling wine" ("Champagner bekommen, Sekt bezahlen") in order to emphasize the good value it
claimed to be offering at a low price. See BGH, Urteil v. 17.1.2002 (1 ZR 290/99). The second case was
about the label of a drink indicating that it was made from "champagne pears" ("aus der
Champagnerbratbime"). See BGH, Urteil v. 19.5.2005 (I ZR 262/02). In both cases, the reference to
champagne was considered inadmissible by the German Federal Supreme Court. It did not help that in
the second case, the indication on the label was correct; the fruit from which the drink was made had
been called "champagne pear" for more than a century, and it was even validly registered under that
name as a protected plant variety.
13. See the modalities of use that are prohibited under GI Regulation, supra note 6, art. 13. The
statements in the text above need to be qualified in so far as, after writing this, the ECJ has judged that
1321
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the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), which has earned some reputation
as a watchdog for freedom of competition and consumer information when
it comes to exaggerated claims for trademark protection, is notably
compliant with demands for strong GI protection, 14 as is best illustrated by
the Parma Ham15 and Grana Padano 16 cases. To contend that residents of
EU member states or regions other than those in or around the city of
Parma are not capable of slicing ham or grinding cheese properly, and to
assert that it is not even possible for persons owning those skills to educate
and monitor others in the proper exercise of those techniques, are
statements that, in a "normal" case, the ECJ would have treated with
disdain-but in those cases, the court chose to fully endorse both
arguments.
However, I'm not here to criticize the European system. If it does give
a headache, it is for the Europeans to resolve the problem among
themselves. Nevertheless, the practical experience with the EU GI
Regulation does have some relevance for the credibility of the European
position assumed in international negotiations regarding the extension of
the protection presently granted under TRIPS. If the system does not
function satisfactorily and efficiently in the framework of a relatively
homogeneous region such as the European Union, how realistic can it be to
expect that similar models would operate smoothly on the international
level? In order to restrict international registration to denominations that
are actually worth protecting because of their unique informational value,
the process would have to be underpinned by a huge bureaucracy capable
of handling the scrutiny of claims, as well as the monitoring and
verification of specifications, etc. To imagine the set up of such an
international authority is an unrealistic dream that might easily turn into a
veritable nightmare in practice. On the other hand, to install international
protection mechanisms without so much as requiring a genuine link
comparative advertising by a beer brewery making reference to champagne was not inadmissible per se.
See Case _381/05, De Landtsheer Emmanuel SA v. Comit6 Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne,
decision of 14 April 2007.
14. Another case to be mentioned in this context concerned wine growers in Italy who, for a long
time, had been making a wine from a specific variety of grapes called "Italian Tocai." Somewhere in
the long and winding history of treaties concluded between Italy and Hungary preceding Hungary's
accession to the EU, when the Hungarian government (quite understandably) sought to secure
protection for their wine denominations on a bilateral basis, it had been forgotten by the agents acting
on the Italian side to insert a "grandfather clause" mentioning the Italian Tocai variety, with the bitter
consequence that the entitlement to use that traditional name ran out at the beginning of 2007. See Case
C-347/03, Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali,
2005 E.C.R. 1-3785.
15. Case C-108/01, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma & Salumificio S. Rita v. Asda Stores Ltd.,
2003 E.C.R. 1-5121.
16. Case C-469/00, Ravil SARL v. Bellon Import SARL, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5053.
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between the quality of products and their geographic origin, appears even
more inappropriate and even dangerous. The possibly far-reaching
implications for the freedom of others this would entail cannot be justified
if GIs are accepted for protections that have no, or only insubstantial,
inherent informational value.
In addition, the assertions often made by the EU and other interested
parties (in particular Switzerland)-that strengthening the international
system of GI protection would also be instrumental for the protection of
traditional knowledge vested in products grown and/or manufactured in
developing countries-need to be seriously qualified. Irrespective of the
actual quality of goods grown or produced in developing countries, such
goods will only be economically successful if they are in demand on the
market in countries where consumers are willing to pay (more) for them. It
is obvious that such demand will not automatically result from registration
of the term and the exclusive right it confers. Rather, market success needs
to be fostered in the same way as it would have to be done for trademarks,
i.e., by launching marketing campaigns-and that is usually very costly.
The promises made to developing countries tend to disregard that point.
What the local specialties grown or produced in those countries need in the
first place is to be present and to become known on the market of countries
where consumers are wealthy enough to pay high prices. This must be the
primary concern. Once that goal has been achieved, the interests in
maintaining the market position may be well served by a reliable, robust,
and simple system of protection against commercial misrepresentation of
geographical origin, as basically applies already under the pertinent version
of TRIPS Article 22.
Against this, it may be argued that there is a critical period when the
potential value of a designation is recognized by some, without public
awareness yet having reached the point at which the term is understood by
the relevant circles as indicating a specific geographical origin. During that
vulnerable phase, others may be tempted to trade off their own goods under
the same or a similar designation, or the term may be watered down and
become generic. 17 There is no way of denying that those risks do exist.
However, this hardly justifies the introduction of a generally oversized and
overprotective system like the worldwide protection conferred by interna-
tional registration. Instead, one should push towards the application of
stricter standards with regard to assessment of the misleading character of
17. This is illustrated, for example, by the history of Basmati rice, which has become generic in




commercial statements about geographic origin or the bad faith use or reg-
istration of signs having a geographic connotation.
As stated above, the establishment of an informal international regis-
try for GIs in the form of a database might provide a useful tool in that
context.18 It could help to detect applications for designations that are not
known, or are only scarcely known, in the country of protection at the time
of filing, but of which the applicant knows or has reason to know that they
have an incumbent marketing potential because of the quality-related asso-
ciations connected with the designations in other countries. 19 On the other
hand, GIs of the third category-i.e., terms that are confined to indicating
places where the relevant goods are produced, without having any meaning
even in the country of origin with regard to the specifics and the quality of
the goods-should not become part of such a database in the first place. If
they do, they should not form an obstacle to registration of the term by
others, as long as an actual and commercially relevant risk of consumer
deception is lacking. The territoriality principle should be given preference
at least with regard to such simple designations.
Finally, regarding the economic consequences of the possible
misappropriation or watering down of GIs in a foreign country before their
original meaning can be sufficiently established, it should be kept in mind
that this does not mean a total loss of marketing potential. The money and
effort that must be invested anyhow in order to make the GI known and to
create a demand for the product 20 should then preferably be spent on
campaigns making consumers aware that the "genuine stuff'-i.e.,
products actually stemming from the geographic area from which the term
derives-is superior in quality to what is otherwise sold under the name.
That way, it will probably not be possible to reconquer the whole (mass)
market-but it may be sufficient to capture the attention and preferences of
the more sophisticated consumers (the "connoisseurs"). In the end, that
could prove to be just as lucrative.
18. That is, I'm siding with the U.S. position rather than with that of the EU.
19. An interesting, although somewhat extreme, example from a related field is the communica-
tion to WIPO by the Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva of 5,000 names of indigenous plant varie-
ties. Communication from the Permanent Mission of Brazil, WIPO Doc. SCT/16/7 (Sep. 29, 2006)
(distributed with the material for the 16th session of WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trade-
marks, Industrial Designs, and Geographical Indications, Nov. 13-17, 2006). According to the letter
accompanying the communication, the list is meant to assist in the task of filtering out trademark appli-
cations that are devoid of distinctive character and to prevent acts of"biopiracy." Id.
20. See discussion supra.
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III. COEXISTENCE
After this survey on possible prospects for international developments,
let us briefly consider the relationship between subsequent GIs and prior
trademarks under present EU law. Although the coexistence solution
imposed by the EU GI Regulation for such conflicts has been accepted by
the WTO Panel as being compatible with TRIPS Articles 16(1) and 17, the
implications of that result are still somewhat doubtful. In particular, the
argument could be made that the panel failed to address the crucial
difference between the "normal" application of the fair use rules, addressed
in TRIPS Article 17, and the specific case submitted to its scrutiny. The
former situation is but a consequence of the fact that the proprietary right to
a term having a certain geographic (or otherwise descriptive) connotation
will never be absolute in the sense that it excludes use which is in
accordance with its primary linguistic meaning. However, GI protection
goes further than that: under the EU system, the owners of such signs do
not just retain their right to make fair use of a descriptive term, but are
allowed to exercise a positive right of their own.
It was suggested above 21 that such a result could be justified only in
extraordinary cases, where the GI is capable of indicating unique quality.
As a matter of principle, this complies with the general objectives of the
EU GI Regulation; protection is intended to be confined to products
deriving their special or unique quality from the natural environment.
Whether the actual application of the regulation always lives up to that
ambition is another matter.
In any case, the dimensions of the issue do not seem to be such that it
should warrant a serious transatlantic skirmish. There is little evidence that
conflicts between trademarks and GIs are likely to occur in a conspicuous
number of cases. 22 The EU even tried to argue (though unsuccessfully)
before the WTO that the GI Regulation as well as the EU trademark system
were designed so as to practically eliminate any such risk.
This does not mean, however, that the issue of coexistence between
different types of signs and the rules eventually governing the cohabitation
between such odd couples do not merit further investigation. On the
21. See supra Part 1.
22. Much of the misgivings piled up on both sides of the Atlantic seem to be nourished by remi-
niscences of past battles, when traditional geographical denominations for wines were "exported" to the
New World and Australia. It is unlikely that conflicts evolving in the EU, and thus falling under the EU
GI regime, will assume similar dimensions in our times. However, one practical example of what may
occur even today is the Torres case to which reference is made in Professor Gangjee's presentation. See
supra note 1.
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contrary, this might be one of the most challenging, though widely
neglected, topics to discuss under European trademark law. More than with
regard to GIs, the practical relevance of the topic becomes visible in the
relationship between trademarks and trade names. The ECJ has taken a
markedly generous stand towards the possibility of making use of a
subsequent trade name coexisting with a prior trademark. It may be more
than a mere coincidence that the conflict that gave rise to the ECJ decision
establishing that approach dealt with the notorious clash between the
"Budweiser" trademark owned by Anheuser-Busch and the trade name-
and also GI of sorts-"Budweiser," relating to the Czech brewery
Budjovick , Budvar. 23 In essence, the ECJ ruled that even if no valid
rights in the trade name could be asserted in the member state where the
conflict arose and at the point in time when the trademark right was
acquired, the trademark holder still had to tolerate further use of the trade
name-including its use "as a mark," i.e., use perceived by the public as
indicating the commercial origin of products-on the basis of Article 6.1 (a)
of the European Trademark Directive.24 In the Court's view, the trade name
had to be considered an "existing prior right" (independent of its protection
under the relevant national law!) in the meaning of the third sentence of
TRIPS Article 16(1).25
Until now, the impact of that ruling on the legal concepts governing
the relationship between trademarks and trade names has not been explored
to its full extent. It seems, however, that the approach taken by the ECJ
involves an even higher risk for erosion of the exclusivity principle en-
shrined in the first sentence of TRIPS Article 16(1), and is much harder to
control and to contain in its consequences than what may follow from the
WTO Panel decision regarding GI/trademark conflicts.
No attempt is made here to further evaluate the question of whether
the ECJ's approach endorsed in the Anheuser-Busch case actually complies
with TRIPS Articles 16 and 17. Submitting that no problems are posed
under international law, the task remains to determine the criteria according
to which the distinction is made, on the one hand, between a situation when
the use of a trade name (or a GI), although evoking a certain degree of like-
lihood of confusion, still appears to be tolerable, and, on the other hand,
those cases when the interest of the public to be protected against a risk of
misallocation of resources becomes preponderant. Following the case law
23. See Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch v. Budejovick' Budvar, 2004 E.C.R. 1-10989. The town
where the brewery is situated-Ceske Budejovice in the Czech language-was called "Budweis" under
the former Austrian-Hungarian rule and is still known in some parts under that name.
24. See id. para. 58-85.
25. See id. para. 86-100.
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of the ECJ, it is clear that it is not decisive for the assessment whether the
conflicting name is used "as a mark" or not.26 Apart from that, in the rele-
vant cases the ECJ only made reference to the circumstances of the indi-
vidual case, 27 without outlining in a more specific manner how the
assessment should proceed and how the interests should be balanced.
Of course, it is beyond these comments to embark on a thorough in-
vestigation of the issues addressed thereby. As was set out above, at least
for GIs, part of the answer may lie in a differentiated approach based on the
inherent informational value of the indication. Another differentiation
needs to be made between the various grades of "likelihood of confusion"
resulting from use of a protected mark by another person. 28 In European
law, the latter topic is often treated as a sort of taboo, in order to not inter-
fere with the general notion that every likelihood of confusion coincides
with an actual risk of the public being misled about the commercial origin
of goods. It might be considered "politically dangerous" to admit and dis-
cuss openly that in quite a number of cases usually considered to constitute
trademark infringement, the actual risk for consumers being misled is
rather small-negligible for all practical matters. However, only when the
gradual and conceptual differences between, on the one hand, the likeli-
hood of confusion in the ordinary meaning of trademark law and, on the
other hand, the situation where consumers are actually at risk of making
wrong purchasing decisions are fully understood and explored will it be
possible to enter into fruitful considerations about the ramifications of co-
existence between different types of signs-and, possibly, even between
signs belonging to the same category.
26. See Case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co. v. Putsch GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. 1-691.
27. See id. para. 26 ("Since the case concerns bottled drinks, the circumstances to be taken into
account by that court would include in particular the shape and labelling [sic] of the bottle in order to
assess, more particularly, whether the producer of the drink bearing the indication of geographical
origin might be regarded as unfairly competing with the proprietor of the trade mark.'.); see also An-
heuser-Busch, 2004 E.C.R. 1-10989, para. 83 ("In assessing whether the condition of honest practice is
satisfied, account must be taken first of the extent to which the use of the third party's trade name is
understood by the relevant public, or at least a significant section of that public, as indicating a link
between the third party's goods and the trade-mark proprietor or a person authorised to use the trade
mark, and secondly of the extent to which the third party ought to have been aware of that. Another
factor to be taken into account when making the assessment is whether the trade mark concerned enjoys
a certain reputation in the Member State in which it is registered and its protection is sought, from
which the third party might profit in selling his goods.").
28. This is what the statements, quoted in supra note 27, of the ECJ's reasoning seem to be aimed
at. However, the ECJ does not openly address the crucial point, i.e., that the national courts need to
assess whether the consumers are in "real" danger of being confused about commercial origin. In
addition to likelihood of confusion, of course, aspects indicating deliberate free-riding on a trademark's
reputation also need to be taken into account.

